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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is the theoretical analysis of price discrimination through the
strategy of mixed bundling exercised by a buyer setting prices under conditions of monop-
sony power. Mixed bundling takes the form of offering either to trade separately in differ-
ent goods at specific prices, or to trade in a package of goods at an aggregate price which
includes a premium.
Mixed bundling is relative to no bundling both profit, for the price setting firm, and
trade enhancing.1 An example of bundling is the case of procurement where contracts
are combined by the US government agencies. The result of our analysis is that the US
government should ensure that it is of a mixed format.2 Such an approach is reflected
in the recent pieces of legislation concerning defence procurement where it is required
that both bundled and unbundled purchasing arrangements have been considered before
a decision is reached.3
∗We wish to thank Allan Muir for his very helpful comments. We also thank, for their comments and
questions, the participants of the conference in honour of Professor C. D. Aliprantis, held at the University
of Purdue, between 17-18 October 2005. Finally, the present version owes a lot to the suggestions and very
incisive comments of a referee of this Journal. Correspondence to: X. Dassiou.
1It is also always weakly profit enhancing relative to pure bundling in which only the bundle is offered.
We discuss this briefly in footnote 7.
2This is argued at some length in Dassiou - Glycopantis (2006).
3Analogous, for the case of monopoly, is the decision in 2004 by the European Commission to force
1
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Mixed bundling can also be used to deal with information asymmetries. If the firm is
unable to determine the quality of the goods offered by a trading partner, it may find it
profitable to bundle its purchases. This feature introduces what we refer to as partner
preference (e.g. adverse selection). By bundling its purchases and offering a premium
for doing so, the firm can reduce adverse selection problems by enhancing its ability to
successfully identify trading partners and increase profits.
Mixed purchase bundling by the buyer attracts sellers with low costs in either or both
goods, leaving out only firms with high costs in both goods. Hence increasing the volume
of trade in each good relative to no bundling. As a result, in the case of US government
procurement practices trade will increase. This is discussed in Dassiou - Glycopantis
(2006).
From the point of view of the price setting buyer, under transactions bundling he offers
a bundled price which is higher than the sum of the two separate prices.4 In our model
package purchasing reduces the buyer’s problem which arises from the dispersion in the
sellers’ individual costs.5 Offering a combined price which is higher than the sum of
the individual prices he attracts also sellers with a high cost in one of the goods but a
reasonable overall cost for the bundle. On the other hand, the separate prices are set to
extract surplus from those producers who might find it more profitable to trade in only
one good.
Microsoft to also sell a version of its Windows Operating System (WOS) without its Windows Media
Player (WMP). This is an imposed switch from pure bundling, which was practised for entry deterrence
purposes, to mixed bundling (Ayres - Nalebuff (2005)).
4We have discussed transaction bundling in its textbook format of a price setting monopolist in Dassiou
- Glycopantis (2005b), and in its linked exchange form in Dassiou et al (2004).
5For an analogous analysis of the monopoly case, see Pepall et al. (2005, p.174) and Nalebuff (2003).
Also, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) in a more technical approach show that the customers’ valuation of
a bundle becomes more predictable as more independent items are added. By averaging out high and low
valuations for separate goods, the demand curve for the bundle, in relation to those of the individual goods,
becomes more elastic. In the limit, as the number of products in the bundle increases, the monopolist can
extract 100% of consumer surplus. Finally as our referee pointed out, there has been also research on the
use of bundling in selling multiple objects through auctions. Notably Chakraborty (1999) discusses the
case of pure bundling in a Vickrey type auction. In this case the auctioneer bundles together two items
and the combined price is set by the bidders. The outcome is that the larger the number of bidders, the
more likely it becomes that the second highest bundle price at which the items will be sold is lower than
the sum of the individual second highest prices if the goods were offered separately.
Hence, by offering the opportunity of mixed bundling the firm increases its ability to
identify trading partners and thus both enhances its profits and increases the trade volume.
This reason behind purchase bundling by a monopsonist is minimally, if at all, discussed
in the literature.
In our model there are no complementarities between the goods in the bundle. The
argument is that it is profitable for a monopsonist to offer a bundled purchase price which
is higher by a premium than the sum of the individual prices on offer and this does not
rely on the existence of complementarities between the goods. If anything the presence
of these would add a strategic incentive for the monopsonist to bundle (Nalebuff, 2004),
especially if he is faced with potential entrants.
Section 2 discusses the monopsony model, Section 3 proves that the use of mixed bundling
is both profit enhancing for the price setting monopsonist and increases the volume of
trade in both goods. Section 4 summarises the conclusions of our analysis.
2 The Monopsony Case Model
Our model is loosely related to the bundling models of Adams - Yellen (1976) and the tying
model by Whinston (1990). It is closer to the model by McAfee - McMillan - Whinston
(1989), (MMW), that deals with mixed bundling offered by a monopolist, and the Dassiou
et al (2004) model of reciprocal exchange.
There are two goods for potential trade, G1 and G2, between a monopsonistic firm P,
and a collection of firms, M, which can be of a number of types. Firms in M attach
valuations, equal to the cost of production, θi, of Gi and, depending on the prices offered,
can decide to sell neither, just one or both goods. The vector θ = (θ1, θ2) defines the type
of firm as it is endowed by Nature. It is assumed that θ1 and θ2 have independent uniform
distributions over6 [0, 1]. Every firm in M can supply to P at most one unit of each good.
P, the monopsonist buyer, does not observe the costs; he only knows the probability
distribution from which they are drawn. P obtains utility per unit of the good, SPi =
6The case presented can be considered as a limiting case. The unit space is divided into squares of
equal area and at every corner there is a firm with valuations given by the coordinates of that point. All
valuations are taken to be independent and equally probable. In the limit each square becomes smaller
and smaller.
αi + βiθi where αi, βi ≥ 0, which depends on the cost of the good. S
P
i is the valuation of
the good bought by the monopsonist. Prices p = (p1, p2) and a possible premium ǫ > 0
for selling both goods as a bundle are set and announced by firm P. Because the goods
are bought by P we take pi ≤ 0 with p = (p1, p2) ≥ (−1,−1). The prices are set with the
objective of maximising his payoff function which is equal to his expected net surplus. For
symmetry to the valuations by the suppliers, which lie in [0, 1], we will set (αi + βiθi) ∈
[0, 1]. The net surplus to the monopsonist per unit of Gi of SPi + pi.
We may think of P as someone, (e.g. the government), who is considering to buy a number
of flats offering a single price for an unfurnished flat, a single price for a complete set of
furniture, or a bundle price with a premium for a furnished flat. We will assume that the
buyer uses as a proxy for the quality of the flat and the quality of furniture their costs to
the respective sellers. These costs are unobservable to him but he has however sufficient
knowledge of the production conditions to know their distribution. He can therefore form
an expectation of the surplus that he will receive by buying unfurnished flats, sets of
furniture, and furnished flats. By summing up these expectations he obtains a set of
prices which he will offer so that the expected surplus from such purchases is maximised.
P’s surplus function depends on the type of the firm with which he transacts, and he takes
cost as a signal of the quality of the good produced. The importance assigned by the buyer
P to cost, i.e. the ”cost informativeness”, is expressed by the coefficient βi. We refer to
βi as the degree of P’s partner preference as it is the only parameter used by the buyer
to distinguish between suppliers. The uncovering of the cost of the good is now of double
importance for P. It is both relevant for assigning a price to extract the maximum from
the seller’s surplus, but also for determining P’s own valuation. In the case of βi = 0,
there is no partner preference, and the cost of the good is no longer used by P as a proxy
to its value.
On the other hand, αi can be thought of as the component of P’s valuation of good Gi,
which is independent of the cost of the good. In that sense we refer to it as the certainty
component, as it does not vary by supplier but only depends on the good. This is the
part of the value that P assigns to the good through his use of prior external, market
information. It also reflects his individual preference for Gi. Since SPi ≤ 1, in the extreme
case where αi = 1, it follows that βi = 0 and P’s net surplus, 1 + pi, will be non-negative.
The prices p1, p2 are offered for the single transactions in each good, and pb = p1+ p2− ǫ,
is the price offered for the two purchases bundled together. At prices p = (p1, p2, pb), there
are four possibilities. A firm will choose to sell neither good, and we denote by R0(p) the
relevant area (θ1, θ2); or sell G1 only, R1(p); or sell G2 only, R2(p); or sell both goods,
R12(p).
The variables p1, p2 and ǫ will be chosen by P to maximize his expected surplus
S(p1, p2, ǫ). We are concerned with local maxima. In the first instance the maximisa-
tion of S(p1, p2, ǫ) is sought with respect to p1, p2 for a fixed ǫ > 0, and then we will
also look for a local maximum of S(p1, p2, ǫ) with respect to all three variables. The
surprising outcome is that choosing to offer a positive premium is surplus enhancing for
the monopsonist, without the need to assume any complementarities in the monopsonist’s
preferences.
The four possibilities mentioned earlier are defined as:
R0(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : 0 > −θ1 − p1, −θ2 − p2, −θ1 − θ2 − (p1 + p2 − ǫ)} (1)
R1(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : −θ1 − p1 ≥ 0,−θ1 − p1 > −θ2 − p2, −θ1 − θ2 − (p1 + p2 − ǫ)}; (2)
R2(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : −θ2− p2 ≥ 0, −θ2 − p2 > −θ1 − p1, −θ1 − θ2 − (p1 + p2− ǫ)}; (3)
R12(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : −θ1 − θ2 − (p1 + p2 − ǫ) ≥ 0, −θ1 − p1, −θ2 − p2} (4)
where p = (p1, p2). These four sets partition the unit square.
The expected net surplus is equal to:
S=
∫
R1(p)
(α1 + β1θ1 + p1) dF (θ) +
∫
R2(p)
(α2 + β2θ2 + p2) dF (θ)+
∫
R12(p)
(α1 + β1θ1 + α2 + β2θ2 + p1 + p2 − ǫ) dF (θ) (5)
Both θ1 and θ2 are dual role variables as participation constraints for both M as well as
P. In the case of no bundling for example, M will not sell good Gi to P unless −pi ≥ θi,
and P in turn will not purchase the good unless −pi ≤ αi + βiθi .
In the monopoly case discussed by Adams - Yellen (1976, p. 481) the exclusion condition,
that “no individual consumes a good if the cost exceeds his reservation price”, implies
allocative efficiency. In our model of monopsony where θ1 and θ2 are dual participation
parameters for both M and P, such a condition would require that no company sells in the
package a good whose cost exceeds P’s valuation. This ensures productive efficiency and
it will be shown to hold always.
3 Results
First we are concerned with the change in the local maximum of S as ǫ varies. This
change depends on the values of αi, βi and is denoted by ψ. We prove:
Theorem 1 Let ǫ be exogenous. For α1, α2 > 0, the local maximum of S at ǫ = 0
increases with ǫ, i.e. ψ is positive. This increase (ψ) is a positive function of αi, βi, i =
1, 2, and furthermore for both the special cases (i) dαi = −
1
2dβi = dω and (ii) dαi =
−dβi = dω, the differential dψ is positive for dω > 0.
Proof.
It is easier to rewrite (1) to (4) as (6) to (9):
R0(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : θ1 > −p1, θ2 > −p2, θ1 + θ2 > −p1 − p2 + ǫ}; (6)
R1(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : θ1 ≤ −p1, θ2 > −p2 + ǫ}; (7)
R2(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : θ1 > −p1 + ǫ, θ2 ≤ −p2}; (8)
R12(p) = {θ ∈ [0, 1]
2 : θ1 ≤ −p1 + ǫ, θ2 ≤ −p2 + ǫ, θ1 + θ2 ≤ −p1 − p2 + ǫ}. (9)
The relations in R12(p) are equivalent to −(p1+ p2− ǫ)− θ1− θ2 ≥ 0 and −(p1+ p2− ǫ)−
θ1 − θ2 ≥ −pi − θi for i = 1, 2, and therefore suppliers of this type sell the bundle to the
price setting buyer P. Note that for P to find it profitable to trade in both goods the gain
from trading in only one good, say Gi, rather than the bundle should be smaller or equal
to the forgone value of not purchasing the other good, Gj. This means that we require
pi − (p1 + p2 − ǫ) ≤ αj + βjθj. Combining this inequality with the one corresponding to
R12(p) gives that θj ≤ −pj + ǫ ≤ αj + βjθj for j = 1, 2 and i = j.
7 This shows that the
exclusion condition as defined in the previous section is satisfied.
7Note that as mentioned in Adams - Yellen (1976, p. 483) and in MMW (1989, p. 374) mixed bundling
is always weakly better than pure bundling for the monopolist. For a textbook analysis on this, see Pepall
et al (2005, p. 173). In terms of our paper the monopsonist can at worst use a mixed bundling strategy
that replicates the pure bundling offer and sets arbitrarily low individual prices by fixing ǫ appropriately.
We place point (p1, p2) in the unit square (θ1, θ2) in Figure 1. The sum of the four integrals
below exhausts the area in which M will be selling one or both goods. The expected net
surplus to P, given in (5), becomes more explicitly:
S=
1∫
−p2+ǫ
−p1∫
0
(α1 + β1θ1 + p1) dθ1dθ2 +
1∫
−p1+ǫ
−p2∫
0
(α2 + β2θ2 + p2) dθ2dθ1+
−p2+ǫ∫
0
−p1∫
0
(α1 + β1θ1 + α2 + β2θ2 + pb) dθ1dθ2+
−p1+ǫ∫
−p1
−p1−p2+ǫ−θ1∫
0
(α1 + β1θ1 + α2 + β2θ2 + pb) dθ2dθ1. (10)
Solving the integrals in (10) we obtain:
S = −0.5
[
p21(2− β1) + p
2
2(2− β2) + 2α1p1 + 2α2p2
]
−
[(3− β1 − β2)p1p2 + α1p2 + α2p1] ǫ+
1
2
[α1 + α2 + (3− β1 − β2)(p1 + p2)] ǫ
2 −
1
6
(3− β1 − β2)ǫ
3. (11)
For ǫ = 0 we have
S 0 = −0.5[p21(2− β1) + p22(2− β2) + 2α1p1 + 2α2p2] (12)
The (locally) optimal p∗1, p
∗
2 for the two goods are obtained from
∂S0
∂p1
=
∂S0
∂p2
= 0 of
relation (12) which imply:
p∗1 = −
α1
2− β1
, p∗2 = −
α2
2− β2
. (13)
For negative prices we require β1, β2 < 2 and the function in (12) is strictly concave.
Therefore an interior maximum obtained using (13) is a global one. Note that since
|p∗1|, |p
∗
2| ≤ 1 the above means that α1 + β1 ≤ 2 and α2 + β2 ≤ 2.
Next we calculate
∂S
∂ǫ
|ǫ=0,p∗
1
,p∗
2
. This is equal to ψ =
α1α2
(2− β1)(2− β2)
> 0, implying
that the optimal value of ǫ is greater than zero, i.e. bundling is locally optimal. Moreover
as
∂ α1α2(2−β1)(2−β2)
∂αi
=
αj
(2− β1)(2 − β2)
> 0 and
∂ α1α2(2−β1)(2−β2)
∂βi
=
α1α2
(2− βi)
2(2− βj)
> 0 for
i = j, i.e. the profitability of bundling is an increasing function of both the certainty
component and the degree of partner preference in both goods.
This ensures that the surplus to P from those suppliers that switch from offering the package to selling
only one good will either stay the same or increase.
We now consider specific changes in αi and βi:
(i) Holding the expected value of P’s valuation of G1 constant, i.e. d[E(SP1 )] = 0, implies
a parametrisation dα1 = −
1
2dβ1 = dω. Hence,
dψ =
[
α2dα1
(2− β1)(2 − β2)
+
α1α2dβ1
(2− β1)
2(2− β2)
]
=
[
α2
(2− β1)(2− β2)
−
2α1α2
(2− β1)
2(2− β2)
]
dω ⇐⇒
dψ =
α2
(2− β1)(2− β2)
(
1−
2α1
2− β1
)
dω.
The term outside the bracket is positive, while the denominator of 2−β1−2α12−β1
is positive
and 2 − β1 − 2α1 = 2−
[
1
2β1 + α1
]
−
[
1
2β1 + α1
]
. As by assumption 0  α1 + β1θ1  1,
it follows that 0  α1 +
1
2β1  1. This proves that dψ > 0 for dω > 0. Analogous results
are also obtained for d[E(SP2 )] = 0.
(ii) The impact of the certainty component αi on profitability dominates that of βi. We
consider this second parametrisation case, where αi + βi = 1, because as it is explained
below it gives us the largest percentage improvements in P’s net surplus (S ∗) from
purchase bundling.
Assuming the changes dα1 = −dβ1 = dω and totally differentiating ψ:
dψ =
∂ψ
∂α1
dα1 +
∂ψ
∂β1
dβ1 =
[
α2
(2− β1)(2− β2)
−
α1α2
(2− β1)
2(2− β2)
]
dω =
α2
(2− β1)(2− β2)
(
1−
α1
2− β1
)
dω
which is positive for dω > 0, given that α1 + β1 ≤ 2. An analogous result is obtained for
dα2 = −dβ2. In other words if αi is increased (decreased) and βi is decreased (increased)
by the same amount, P’s expected net surplus will increase (decrease).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Unless P’s ability to ascertain the quality of the goods it considers buying equals zero,
bundling the purchases is surplus superior to no bundling. The superior profitability of
mixed purchase bundling (relative to no bundling), as expressed by ψ, of a monopsonist
is only eliminated if either α1 = 0 or/and α2 = 0.
We now turn our attention to the case in which ǫ is chosen by the firm.
Theorem 2 Let ǫ be endogenous. S∗ can be obtained which is a continuous and differ-
entiable function of ǫ, by substituting p1 and p2, as functions of the premium in S .
Proof. We calculate the local maximum through successive maximisation. First we
maximise over p1, p2 for given of ǫ. Re-substituting we maximize with respect to ǫ.
8
First order conditions with respect to p1, p2 are:
p1n− α1 − ǫα2 + ǫp2k −
1
2
ǫ2k = 0
p2m− α2 − ǫα1 + ǫp1k −
1
2
ǫ2k = 0 (14)
for n = β1 − 2 < 0, m = β2 − 2 < 0, k = n +m + 1 = β1 + β2 − 3. The second order
conditions are given by the principal minors of the Hessian matrix

 β1 − 2 −ǫ(3− β1 − β2)
−ǫ(3− β1 − β2) β2 − 2

 (15)
whose determinant is restricted to be positive in order to have an interior maximum
solution9:
(β1 − 2)(β2 − 2)− ǫ
2(β1 + β2 − 3)
2 > 0.
Solving the first order conditions in (14) we get:
8See Glycopantis - Muir (2004). This approach is based on the maximization of a function on a compact
set. The prices are in [−1, 0]2 and ǫ can be taken in an interval around a local maximum. Considering all
variables together gives identical results.
9The inequality that follows in the text determines the range of values for ǫ which allow for an interior
maximum. Specifically, for β
1
= β
2
= 0 ⇒ ǫ < 0.67, for βi = 1, βj = 0 =⇒ ǫ < 0.7071, and for
β
1
= β
2
= 1 =⇒ ǫ < 1.
p1 =
1
2nm− 2ǫ2k2
(
2m(α1 + ǫα2)− 2ǫk(α2 + ǫα1) + ǫ
2mk − ǫ3k2
)
, (16)
p2 =
1
2nm− 2ǫ2k2
(
2n(α2 + ǫα1)− 2ǫk(α1 + ǫα2) + ǫ
2nk − ǫ3k2
)
(17)
where the denominators in (16) and (17) are non-zero because of the second order condi-
tions above.
Substituting back into (11) gives:
S ∗= (2nm− 2ǫ2k2)−1×
(
α21(ǫ
2(2k − n)−m) + 2α1α2ǫ(ǫ
2k + k −m− n) + α1ǫ
2(k − n)(ǫk −m)+
α22(ǫ
2(2k −m)− n) + α2ǫ
2(k −m)(ǫk − n) +
1
12
kǫ3(2ǫ2k2 − 3ǫk(m+ n) + 4mn)
)
. (18)
Again the denominator is different from zero which guarantees the differentiability of the
function in an interval around a locally optimal ǫ. This completes the proof of Theorem
2.
Existence of local optimum and comparative statics results.
The derivatives of S ∗ in (18) with respect to ǫ are too complex to allow us to obtain the
locally optimal S ∗ and then analyse the effect of varying the parameters. For specific
values of the parameters α1, α2, β1, β2, we calculate the locally optimal ǫ and S
∗,
the corresponding optimal prices, the improvement in the net surplus value and in trade
volume.
For β1 = 1 − α1 and β2 = 1 − α2, tables
10 showing the effects of changing α1 or α2,
one at a time, are presented here11. We choose this relationship between the parameters
because compared with alternative combinations they give the largest values for S ∗,
both absolutely and relative to no bundling. For α1 = α2 = 1, a value of S ∗=0.5492 is
attained at the premium of ǫ = 0.4714 and the optimal prices are p1 = p2 = −
1
3 . This
case is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that since β1 = β2 = 0, the second order conditions
combined with the fact that ǫ is positive mean that ǫ < 23 as already mentioned
12.
10Tables and Figures are in the Appendix.
11For the choices of different parameters see Dassiou - Glycopantis (2005a).
12A sufficient, though not necessary, condition for a local maximum to exist was that both αi + βi ≤ 1
and αj + βj ≤ 1.
Numerical calculations13 confirm that S ∗, |p1|, |p2| and ǫ are increasing with the chosen
values α1 and α2, (see Tables 1, 2, 3). Table 4 calculates the percentage improvement in
P’s net surplus from purchase bundling. This is largest for equal values in the certainty
components and the degrees of partner preference between the two goods, while it decreases
for diverging values between the α’s and the β′s. For example the improvement is only
4.5% for αi = 0.2 and αj = 1, and 12.12% for α1 = α2 = 0.2.
When the degrees of adverse selection of the two goods are identical, it is more profitable to
bundle purchase the higher the level of quality uncertainty. Bundling allows P to extract
more surplus by enhancing his ability to identify his partners. On the other hand, this
surplus improvement for mixed purchase bundling becomes smaller the larger the values
of the certainty component, as the problem of identification becomes less acute. These
findings are illustrated in Table 4, and they are of additional interest because they contrast
to the findings concerning the impact of bundling on the volume of trade. This is discussed
below.
For the values of the parameters chosen, the trade volume increases relative to the case
of no bundling. P reduces in absolute value both the separate prices he offers to trad-
ing partners (|p1| , |p2|), relative to their unbundled values (|p
∗
1| , |p
∗
2| ), thus reducing the
incentive for a firm M to participate in R1 and R2, while offering a premium ǫ for the
bundled transaction. This is substantial enough to increase trade in both G1, denoted by
(RB1 +R
B
12), and G2, denoted by (R
B
2 +R
B
12), relative to their unbundled sizes.
14
Numerically we can check that there is always an increase in the volume of trade in both
goods relative to its unbundled size. We substitute for the bundled and unbundled surplus
maximising prices and the corresponding optimal value of ǫ and calculate for these the
expressions
RB1 +R
B
12 −R
UB
1 −R
UB
12 = p
∗
1 − p1 − ǫp2 +
ǫ2
2
, (19)
and
13For a complete description see Dassiou - Glycopantis (2005a).
14In Figure 1 we indicate the regions of trade under bundling. They are RB12(p) = OIAWJ, R
B
1 (p) =
JWDH, RB2 (p) = IGCA, R
B
0 (p) =WACO
′D. For the sake of comparison we also indicate the unbundled
regions of trade which are RU12(p) = OKUL, R
U
1 (p) = LUFH, R
U
2 (p) = KUEG, and R
U
0 (p) = UEO
′F .
RB2 +R
B
12 −R
UB
2 −R
UB
12 = p
∗
2 − p2 − ǫp1 +
ǫ2
2
, (20)
both of which were found to be always positive for the full range of possible values for α1
and α2.
Relations (19) and (20) imply that the improvement in the trade for G1 is more (less)
substantial the larger (smaller) α2, and the smaller (larger) α1 is, while the reverse is
true for G2. Through bundling, there is more room for an improvement in the volume
of trade in a good with low degree of quality certainty if its purchase is combined with
a good of substantially higher quality certainty. For example, compared to no bundling
the percentage increase in the trade volume of G1 (G2) is equal to 58.13% (4.44%) for
α1 = 1 − β1 = 0.2, α2 = 1 − β2 = 1 and, symmetrically, equal to 4.44% (58.13%) for
α1 = 1− β1 = 1, α2 = 1 − β2 = 0.2. Table 5 shows an illustration of the improvement in
the trade volume for G1 for different values of α1 and α2.
The findings in Table 5 contrast with the findings in Table 4 in two important respects:
First, the size of the surplus improvement is an increasing function of the degree of quality
uncertainty when the latter is equal between the two goods purchased. In contrast, Table 5
indicates that the improvement in the trade volume of either good is a decreasing function
of the degrees of quality uncertainty when the latter are equal between the two goods and
vary inversely in relation to the α′s.
More importantly, in terms of the magnitude of the change, the larger the difference in
the degrees of quality uncertainty between two goods is, the smaller the size of the profit
enhancement that the price setting firm experiences relative to no bundling. This is in
stark contrast to the findings regarding the improvement in the volume of trade under
bundling; this is larger, the larger is the gap in the degree of quality uncertainty.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that mixed purchase bundling in a two product market is locally optimal.
For specific values of the parameters for quality certainty we determine the optimal value
of the premium, prices, the surplus and trade volume. Mixed bundling allows the monop-
sonist to profitably exploit the producers average willingness to sell by offering the option
of a purchase premium for a package sale. This is shown to be profitable, without the
need for the existence of any complementarities between the goods, as the problem of the
dispersion in the sellers’ valuations (costs) of the two goods is reduced.
The volume of trade in goods with high quality uncertainty is increased if the transactions
for such goods are packaged. This increase is higher when such a good is bundled with
one with a substantially lower degree of quality uncertainty.
A deduction from our model is that if it is thought that pure bundling is trade restricting
as in the case of US government procurement, then the right move is a shift towards the
use of mixed bundling, rather than banishing bundling altogether.
5 Appendix
Monopsonist bundling premium values, (ǫ), for
β1 = 1− α1 and β2 = 1− α2
↓ α2\α1 −→ 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 0 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29
0.4 0 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.37
0.6 0 0.27 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.42
0.8 0 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.45
1 0 0.29 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.47
Table 1
Prices (p1, p2) charged by the monopsonist for
β1 = 1− α1 and β2 = 1− α2
↓α2\α1→ 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
0 (0, 0) (−.17, 0) (−.29, 0) (−.38, 0) (−.44, 0) (−.50, 0)
.2 (0,−.17) (−.14,−.14) (−.25,−.13) (−.33,−.11) (−.40,−.10) (−.45,−.09)
.4 (0,−.29) (−.13,−.25) (−.22,−.22) (−.30,−.20) (−.36,−.18) (−.42,−.17)
.6 (0,−.38) (−.11,−.33) (−.20,−.30) (−.27,−.27) (−.33,−.25) (−.38,−.23)
.8 (0,−.44) (−.10,−.40) (−.18,−.36) (−.25,−.33) (−.31,−.31) (−.36,−.29)
1 (0,−.50) (−.09,−.45) (−.17,−.42) (−.23,−.38) (−.29,−.36) (−.33,−.33)
Table 2
Monopsonist’s maximum net surplus
for β1 = 1− α1 and β2 = 1− α2
α2\α1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0 0 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.25
0.2 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.28
0.4 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.33
0.6 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.40
0.8 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.47
1 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.55
Table 3
Monopsonist’s % improvement of maximum net surplus
relative to no bundling for β1 = 1− α1 and β2 = 1− α2
α2\α1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2 12.12 8.11 7.00 5.67 4.49
0.4 8.11 11.40 10.60 9.40 8.10
0.6 7.00 10.60 11.11 10.70 9.40
0.8 5.67 9.40 10.70 10.40 10.05
1 4.49 8.10 9.40 10.05 9.84
Table 4
% improvement in trade volume for G1 relative to no
bundling for β1 = 1− α1 and β2 = 1− α2
↓ α2\α1 −→ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2 15.14 9.38 6.78 5.31 4.44
0.4 31.25 19.27 14.61 11.46 9.58
0.6 43.03 27.62 20.82 16.78 14.08
0.8 51.46 32.79 25.27 20.86 17.59
1 58.13 36.79 28.35 23.47 20.26
Table 5
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